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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880309-CA
Priority No. 2

GILBERTO SUAREZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Case, and
Statement of the Facts are set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief at
IV, 1-6.

Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to Respondent's

Brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Suarez asserts that his jury was selected contrary to
the Constitution of Utah and the Jury Selection and Service Act.

He

further maintains that these violations and other practical
considerations demonstrate prejudice occurred to his substantial
rights demanding a new trial.
The trial court's failure to excuse juror Wolford for
cause was reversible error.

The State's distortion of the facts

regarding this issue must be rejected and the error corrected by
ordering a new trial.
The State failed to present a sufficient quantum of
evidence to support the conviction of Mr. Suarez.

Reversal of that

conviction is therefore required.

The State's conduct of supplying

jurors with information not in evidence and offering personal
beliefs about the case also requires reversal.

ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN UTILIZING JURORS PREVIOUSLY EXCUSED FROM
ANOTHER COURT'S VOIR DIRE PROCESS OF THAT SAME DAY
OVER THE OBJECTION OF COUNSEL.
The State suggests that Appellant's reliance on the jury
list from the Judge Russon trial, Addendum A of the opening brief,
is of questionable utility because the document was not made part of
the record.

Brief of Respondent at 9 n.4.
On the contrary, the juror list from the Russon court was

stipulated to be part of the record by the parties on the suggestion
of the trial court.

R. 109 at 12-13.

Though not intended as an

exhibit for the jury, the list was recognized as part of the record
so that Mr. Suarez might preserve his issue for appeal.

Id.

Attaching the certified copy of the list as an addendum once the
parties and trial court have already agreed that it should be part
of the record violates no principle of law and further excuses it
from the premise briefly mentioned in Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d
121, 123 (Utah 1986), which is cited by the State.

Brief of

Respondent at 9 n.4.
In addition, even if the attachment of Addendum A was
somehow erroneous, the record wholly substantiates that thirteen of
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the twenty-two jurors were rejected or unused participants from the
Judge Russon voir dire.

After declaring a mistrial with the first

jury panel, the trial court informed counsel that a new jury would
be impaneled and the trial begun anew,

R. 108 at 5.

Apparently,

discussions were then held off the record where the court talked
about utilizing jurors excused from other courts1 voir dire
processes to formulate the new panel.

R. 109 at 8-9.

Mr. Suarez

did not object to such a jury panel before the lunch break; but
immediately after lunch and before the panel was seated, Mr. Suarez
did object to utilizing the rejected and unused jurors as the
majority of this new panel.

R. 109 at 3.

The discussion which

followed the arguments of counsel implies that all involved accepted
the premise that thirteen of the twenty-two jurors were from the
Russon panel.

R. 109 at 3-13.

Moreover, the record reflects the

explicit acceptance of that fact:
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, how am I, when the jury clerk
sends me this list telling me that these
twenty-two names are pre-qualified jurors, how am
I to determine that these jurors have been
selected in any other process than through the
jury clerk sending them to me?
MS. REMAL [defense counsel]: Well, because your
clerk just questioned them and found out, in fact,
thirteen of them came from Judge Russon's court.
R. 109 at 8.

After this statement, the record demonstrates that the

parties accepted as fact that the thirteen jurors were from the
Russon voir dire.

See generally R. 109 at 12-13.

In short, no doubt should exist that thirteen of the
twenty-two panelists had prior jury service in Judge Russon's
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courtroom the very same day that they were impaneled as part of the
Suarez jury panel.
The State next hints that Mr. Suarez may have waived any
challenge to the panel when he passed the jurors for cause (Brief of
Respondent at 9) and when he failed to use all of his available
peremptory challenges to remove the Judge Russon jurors.1
Respondent at 14 n.7.

Brief of

The record in this case demonstrates an

objection to the second panel of jurors which included the thirteen
rejected jurors from the Judge Russon court; the record similarly
demonstrates that the trial court was aware of that objection and
took steps to see that the issue was preserved for appellate
purposes.

R. 109 at 3-13.
While alleging that Mr. Suarez did not utilize all his

peremptory challenges to remove the Russon jurors, the State fails
to support why that action would have been necessary regarding this
issue.

Neither Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure nor

case law requires that a challenge to the panel—and in this case,
the larger portion of the panel—be reinforced by exercising
peremptory challenges to correct the error.

Apparently, the State

confuses this issue with the issue of the challenges for cause of an
individual juror which Mr. Suarez advances at Point II of his

1 Inasmuch as the State treated both Point I and Point II
of Mr. Suarez's opening brief in a factual rendition in Point I of
its argument, some confusion exists as to which issue the State is
challenging with these claims.
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opening brief and this brief.2
Mr. Suarez maintains that only nine members of his panel
were selected in conformity with statutory requirements.

One of

them was excused for cause, three were peremptorily challenged by
the State, two sat on the jury, and two others were eliminated
mathematically (inasmuch as they were at the end of the list and
would not be reached).

Compare R. 88-89 with Addendum A of

Appellant's opening brief.

The State's contention that Mr. Suarez

waives this claim because he used a peremptory challenge on one of
the nine properly selected jurors rather than a tainted juror
negates the concept of peremptory challenges requiring Mr. Suarez to
forego attempting to obtain his perception of an impartial jury in
favor of a restrictive obligation to preserve a blanket objection to
the panel for appeal purposes.

The law simply does not require that

Mr. Suarez so subjugate his constitutional right to an impartial
jury.
At Point IB and IC of Respondent's Brief, the State
contends that neither error nor prejudice occurred in the jury
selection process of this case.

The State addresses the

constitutional question of whether the selection process violated
fair cross-section principles by advocating that the Jury Selection

2

Case law requires that a challenge for cause of an
individual juror which is erroneously denied by the trial court must
be corrected by a peremptory challenge, if available, for prejudice
to be established and the issue preserved for appeal. See Point II,
infra. The State confuses the law and these issues when attempting
to extend that principle to the issue of whether the venire was
properly selected.

and Service Act (the "Act") contains permissive language and in
general supports the trial court's behavior.
18-19.

Brief of Respondent at

Subsection (4) of Utah Code Ann. §78-46-13 contains the

permissive language relied on by the State.

It reads:

(4) If there is an unanticipated shortage of
available jurors drawn from a qualified jury
wheel, the court may require the clerk of the
court to summon a sufficient number of trial
jurors selected at random by the court from the
qualified jury wheel.
Utah Code Ann. §78-46-13(4) (1953 as amended) (emphasis added).

The

State urges that the trial court behaved appropriately when
"look[ing] to the reason, spirit and sense of the legislation, as
indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute
dealing with this subject."

Brief of Respondent at 18-19, 19 n.13

(citing Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 191
P.2d 612 (Utah 1948)).
Mr. Suarez respectfully disagrees.

While admitting the

permissive word "may" is contained in the statute, Mr. Suarez
insists that a reading of the entire statute, "in reason, spirit and
sense of the legislation," reveals that no other method of filling a
shortage of jurors is suggested or statutorily available,,
Mr. Suarez contends the permissive "may" of the statute
contemplates only two options.

Either the court may request a

sufficient number of trial jurors selected at random from the
qualified jury wheel to meet the shortage or the court may dismiss
the panel for want of adequate numbers—a partial reason for
dismissing the first jury panel in this case (R. 108 at 5)—and
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start over with a new panel necessarily from jurors selected at
random from the qualified jury wheel.

The trial court's selection

process was contrary to the only two permissible statutory options.
Even the prosecutor in this case recognized that the
proper selection process was not followed.

R. 109 at 9-11.

The

prosecutor's comment and the court's eventual ruling disclose that
this knowing violation of the statute was overlooked because of a
belief that the error might not rise to constitutional dimensions;
therefore, the violation of the Act was tolerated in favor of
courtroom scheduling.

R. 109 at 5, 10-13.

As the Utah Constitution

guarantees the right of an impartial jury (Article I, Section 12,
Constitution of Utah) and the Act interprets that right to include a
jury venire randomly selected from a fair cross-section of the
population (§78-46-2)3, the violation of the Act did reach
constitutional dimensions and did prejudice Mr. Suarez.4
In State v. Poe, 471 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1970), the Utah
Supreme Court found a violation of the Act but failed to find
prejudice because none of the tainted jurors took part in the

3

§78-46-2 states in part:
78-46-2. Jurors selected from random cross
section—
It is the policy of this state that persons
selected for jury service be selected at random
from a fair cross section of the population of the
area served by the court . . .
4

Mr. Suarez notes for clarification that the
constitutional violation encompasses both the right to an impartial
jury and the right to due process as assured him by both the State
and federal constitutions.
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deliberations.

In this case, six of the eight jurors who

deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty against Mr. Suarez were
from the thirteen tainted jurors obtained in violation of the Act.
Compare R. 88-89 with Addendum A of Appellant's opening brief.
Accordingly, the .prejudice absent in Poe appears in this case and
warrants reversal of his conviction.
To the contrary, the State relies on Foster v. State, 499
A.2d 1236 (Md. 1985), for the proposition that jurors may be
"recycled."
misplaced.

Brief of Respondent at 24.

That reliance is

The Maryland Court so ruled because the defense accepted

the jury without qualification and because Maryland statutes
authorized the behavior.

Id.

at 1250.

Because Mr. Suarez objected

to the recycled jurors in his case and because no Utah statute
expressly allows that procedure, neither rationale is present in
this case and Foster v. State is without persuasive effect.
Besides the constitutional and statutory arguments
presented by Mr. Suarez in his opening brief, he also articulated
several pragmatic reasons why this Court should find prejudicial
error in the method utilized to obtain his jury panel.

Mr. Suarez

complains that prior jury service of such recentness as that
involved by the thirteen jurors in this case too easily facilitates
a juror's desire to either sit or not sit on the case by conforming
voir dire answers to those which achieved the desired results in the
prior experience.

Brief of Appellant at 12.

The State responds to

this argument by citing to the additional argument of Mr. Suarez
where he asserts that the trial court in essence had intimidated
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veniremen from freely responding to particular questions.
Respondent at 15 and 15 n.8.

Brief of

This position by the State

misperceives the arguments of Mr. Suarez, sanctions the trial
court's treatment of jurors, and again confuses the two separate
issues he urges, Point I and Point II of his briefs.
For clarification, Mr. Suarez complains that when jurors
sit through two voir dires on the same day, they acquire an
awareness of responses which may assist in either sitting or not
sitting on the jury.

This ability to learn responses is very

distinct from Mr. Suarez's later complaint that the trial judge in
this case conducted voir dire in such a manner as to chill the
responses of the jurors.

Mr. Suarez presents the evidence of the

trial court's curt treatment of prospective jurors in this case not
for the proposition that jurors learned from earlier responses but
rather to support or explain an issue integral to the second point
of his opening brief, that juror Wolford may not have repeated the
earlier assertion during the Judge Russon voir dire for fear of
reprisal.

See Point II, infra.
Ironically, the State attempts to defeat one claim of

error by citing to and endorsing a second and distinct claim of
error.

While Mr. Suarez doubts that the State intended to concede

error in this manner, he urges that the State's acceptance of the
trial court's method of voir dire in this case is misplaced.

He

further urges that this Court should not condone the trial court's
treatment of the jurors in this case inasmuch as the voir dire of
the prospective jurors is far from textbook.

- 9
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Finally, Mr. Suarez continues to maintain that he was
prejudiced by the improper jury selection method as demonstrated by
the facts presented in Point II of his briefs.

A juror's response

in the first voir dire which justified an excusal for cause because
of his inability to be impartial similarly justified an excusal for
cause from the second panel as well. 5

The trial court's failure to

remove that juror for cause from Mr. Suarez's panel required the use
of a peremptory challenge to correct the error and prejudiced
Mr. Suarez's right to a fair trial.

See discussion at Point II

infra and at Point II of Appellant's opening brief.
In summary, Mr. Suarez maintains that the thirteen
veniremen on his panel from the Judge Russon voir dire were selected
contrary to constitutional and statutory provisions.

Mr. Suarez

maintains that because six of those thirteen actually sat as jurors
in this case, and because he had to exercise a peremptory challenge

5 The State attempts to refute this issue by claiming the
police officer testimony in this case was "in favor of the
defendant" and that "[p]olice officer testimony was hardly crucial
to the State's case." Brief of Respondent at 16-17. That assertion
should be rejected as factually incorrect and legally irrelevant.
While important information was brought out on cross-examination of
Officer Housley which supports Mr. Suarez's position on appeal
(R. 110 at 7-11; Brief of Appellant at 24-25? Brief of Respondent at
16-17), three different police officers testified for the State as
witnesses against Mr. Suarez. R. 110 at 3, 12, 16. The State's
attempt to reduce the role and influence of the officers on the jury
(Brief of Respondent at 16-17 n.10) cannot be given serious
attention. See State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 100 (Utah App. 1987)
(Billings, J., dissenting opinion), cert, granted, 98 Utah Adv. Rep.
3, 4 (Jan. 3, 1989). More importantly, the proper focus of this
inquiry is not factual but rather is a legal question of whether the
trial court should have excused a juror for cause who had expressed
an inability to be impartial. See Point II of Appellant's opening
brief.
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to remove one of the thirteen which the trial court should have
excused for cause, prejudice inhered demanding reversal of his
conviction and a new trial ordered.

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO GRANT
MR. SUAREZfS CHALLENGE OF A JUROR FOR CAUSE
REQUIRING HIM TO USE A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE.
The State misperceives the record pertaining to this
issue when claiming that Mr. Suarez did not challenge juror Wolford
for cause until after the jury was empaneled.
at 10-11.

Brief of Respondent

Such an argument demonstrates the State's failure to

grasp the realities of trial and this record.

The State miscontrues

the facts of this case when it states:
It appears from the comments of defense
counsel that she discovered this information [that
Mr. Wolford was excused for cause during the first
voir dire because he stated that he believed
police officers because they were police officers
and that they were right 95% of the time] during
lunch on the first day of trial, and removed Juror
Wolford with a peremptory challenge without
explaining the contents of the forthcoming
affidavit because the Bergeson affidavit was not
available because Ms. Bergeson was busy in her own
trial. Although defendant was allowed to submit
written questions prior to the voir dire, and was
asked for additional questions during the voir
dire, he did not seek to reveal the facts
concerning Juror Wolford until after the jury was
empaneled.
Defendant waited until the close of the
State's case-in-chief to present the Bergeson
affidavit, the contents of which he was aware of
prior to making his initial objection to the
second panel of jurors.
Brief of Respondent at 10-11 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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Even a cursory reading of the State's Appendix A (taken from R. 110
at 25-28) reveals the distortion in the State's characterization of
the record.
The record reveals that following voir dire, a discussion
occurred between court and counsel at the bench; the details of that
discussion were not recorded.

R. 112 at 32.

At the conclusion of

the presentation of evidence the following morning, counsel,
consistent with common practice of the district court judges,6 made
motions out of the presence of the jury.

Among the motions, counsel

placed on the record her objection to the denial of her challenge of
Mr. Wolford for cause including the substance of the Bergeson
affidavit.

R. 110 at 25-27.

She stated:

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, in addition, I
have the matter left over from yesterday—that you
indicated I could put on the record. Would you
like me to do that now?
JUDGE YOUNG:

You may.

R. 110 at 25.
A minute entry by the court clerk reflects that the
motion counsel made regarding juror Wolford was an objection to the

6 While the State emphasizes that defense counsel did not
discuss this topic on the record until after the State rested, an
examination of the overall events reveals that occasion to be the
first "real" opportunity for defense counsel to obtain the benefit
of the record. The jury was not selected until the afternoon of day
one, and following the first two witnesses for the State, no time
was provided for counsel to use the record. R. 21; R. 109 at 89-90;
R. 110 at 27. Day two of trial followed the trial court's usual
Friday morning criminal calendar, undoubtedly preventing the use of
the record prior to the scheduled start. R. 109 at 90.
Accordingly, when the State finished with its evidence just prior to
the lunch break of day two was the first real opportunity for
counsel to place her objection on the record. R. 110 at 23-24.
- 12 -

court's earlier ruling denying the requested excusal for cause.
That minute entry reads as follows:
Comes now counsel for defendant and makes a motion
objecting to the Courts ruling regarding the
proposed Juror Henry Wolford not being excused for
cause by the Court. The Court denies defendants
motion.
R. 22-23.

Analytically, one does not make a motion objecting to a

ruling unless there exists a ruling to object to.

Accordingly, the

trial court necessarily must have already heard and denied the
challenge for cause for counsel to object to that ruling.
Furthermore, all terms used by defense counsel in her
motion are in past tense demanding the inference that she is
restating the earlier motion and what occurred then and there.
R. 110 at 25-28.

Any confusion on that point is easily clarified by

her lead-in remarks cited above.

Other portions of her motion

(attached at Addendum C in this brief) also demonstrate that counsel
was not belatedly objecting or moving to excuse Mr. Wolford for
cause; rather, she was placing on the record what was discussed at
side bar after voir dire and before the peremptory challenges were
taken.

See R. 112 at 32.

In short, court and counsel followed the

common practice of the district court to handle challenges for cause
at side bar providing counsel with the opportunity of placing any
objections on the record at a later time.
Additionally, Mr. Suarez's characterization of the record
is supported by noting the sequence of events following defense
counsel's use of the record to preserve for appeal her earlier
challenge for cause.

Notably, the trial judge did not dispute
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defense counsel's claim to the earlier challenge for cause nor was
it necessary for the court to call upon the prosecutor for his
position on the matter.

The court merely indicated on the record

why he had denied the motion at that time.
The State alludes to another occurrence which supports
that challenges for cause took place at the side bar when it
erroneously states, "Defendant passed for cause another juror who
seemed to be inclined to believe police officer testimony."
of Respondent at 17 (citation omitted).

Brief

In an accompanying

footnote, the State then acknowledges that this juror was excused
for cause despite the fact that "[tjhere is no record explaining the
court's rationale in excusing Ms. Lloyd."
n.ll.

Brief of Respondent at 17

There is no such record because challenges for cause were

handled at the side bar conference indicated in the record just
prior to the exercise of peremptory challenges.

R. 112 at 32

("whereupon a discussion between court and counsel was held at the
bench, after which, the following proceedings were had"—then
indicating peremptory challenges were exercised).

Notably,

peremptory challenges cannot be exercised until challenges for cause
are made.

See Rule 18(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Therefore, the only possible time to have conducted the challenges
for cause was during that side bar conference held ideally between
the completion of voir dire and the exercise of peremptory
challenges, thus substantiating Mr. Suarez's position that what
occurs on the record (R. 110 at 25-27) is not the actual motion as
contended by the State but is counsel recording that earlier
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objection to preserve this issue for appeal.

The State's

misperception of the events should not be allowed to prohibit review
of this issue.
Finally, an analogous use of the record in this case was
relied on by the State to support its rendition of the facts.

The

State claims that Mr. Suarez did not initially object to the trial
court's proposal that a second jury panel could be gathered in part
from the left over jurors from other courtrooms of that same
morning.

However, examining the record reveals no indication that

the court and counsel even discussed the matter that morning.

That

discussion becomes evident only when reading the record of that
afternoon when the court references an off-the-record discussion
occurring after the morning session was completed.
at 4-6 with R. 109 at 8-9.

Compare R. 108

Again, the State's apparent

unfamiliarity with common practices of the district court and the
use of the record must not preclude this court from reaching the
issue now presented.
The State next relies on State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639
(Utah 1988), to support the proposition that failure to timely
request an excusal for cause waives that issue for appellate
review.

Brief of Respondent at 12-13.

State v. Moton, however, is

inapposite to the facts in this case as explained above; here
counsel did make a contemporaneous objection and only later placed
it on the record.

R. 110 at 25-27.

Therefore, the controlling line

of cases, as recognized by State v. Moton and cited in the State's
brief, includes State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1984);
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State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 883 (Utah 1981); and other such cases
cited in Appellant's opening brief at 14-21.
Those cases hold that it is prejudicial error to force an
accused to remove by peremptory challenge that which the trial court
had improperly failed to remove on the challenge for cause.
State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980).

This holding was

very recently reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Jan. 31, 1989), stating that
prejudicial error occurs "where a peremptory challenge is used to
remove a prospective juror who should have been excused for cause."
Id. at 6 (citing State v Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981). 7
The trial court misapplied the law in this case when it
ruled that because Mr. Wolford was removed by peremptory challenge
and was not a participant in the case, no prejudice could have
occurred to Mr. Suarez.

R. 110 at 27.

This ruling by the court is

contrary to the law cited above and referenced in the Brief of
Appellant at pages 14-21.

Accordingly, reversal of Mr. Suarez's

conviction is required.
Importantly, the State does not seriously challenge the
substantive issue of whether Mr. Wolford should have been excused
for cause (see footnote 5, supra), choosing instead to assert a

7 Inasmuch as State v. Gardner was authored well after
the United States Supreme Court opinion of Ross v. Oklahoma, 101
L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), Mr. Suarez retracts his concern over the effect
that ruling may have on the long-standing Utah position. He urges
State v. Gardner indicates the Utah Supreme Court's continued
adherence to the proposition that the use of peremptory challenges
to correct erroneous denials of challenges for cause results in
reversible error.
- 16 -

waiver defense not supported by the record.

With the record now

clarified, Mr. Suarez insists that Mr. Wolford should have been
excused for cause.

Brief of Appellant at 12-21.

Because the trial

court erroneously denied the challenge of Mr. Wolford for cause,
Mr. Suarez utilized a peremptory challenge to correct that error.
R. 88-89.

Accordingly, the law requires that this Court find that

prejudice occurred to Mr. Suarez and reverse the conviction against
him.

POINT III. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AGAINST
MR. SUAREZ FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
Mr. Suarez relies on the argument outlined in his opening
brief to establish insufficient evidence existed to support his
conviction.

Brief of Appellant at 21-30.

He responds briefly,

however, to several of the contentions advanced by the State to the
contrary.

See Point II, Brief of Respondent at 24-33.
Urging rejection of Mr. Suarez's claim of self-defense,

the State cites State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701 (Utah 1985).
Respondent at 25-26.
the present case.

Brief of

State v. Buel, however, is irreconcilable with

By the State's own admission, the defendant in

State v. Buel possessed a dangerous weapon and was convicted on that
charge as well as the charge of Aggravated Assault.

_Id.

In this

case, a significant point insisted on by Mr. Suarez is that no
dangerous weapon—the alleged knife urged by the prosecutor—was
ever seen by anyone, and no such weapon was ever recovered or
introduced into evidence.
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In State v, Buel, the defendant had taunted the victim
and had expressed a desire to kill the victim, and considerable
other evidence contradicted the self-defense claim.
sort occurred in the case at bar.

Nothing of this

Mr. Suarez did not even know the

victim prior to the night in question and only reacted to the
victim's aggressive entrance into his home.
51-53.

R. 110 at 38-41,

Moreover, Mr. Suarez's version of the facts was corroborated

by testimony taken at the hospital from the victim within a short
time after the incident.

R. 110 at 10-11.

Only later did the

victim change his story to a less intrusive entrance, although still
an uninvited and unlawful entrance.

R. 109 at 28-65.

As State v. Buel is incompatible factually with this
case, any reliance thereon is misplaced.
At trial, the prosecutor, through argument, submitted
into evidence that a knife was used, that the description of the
injury was consistent with a knife based on his personal experience,
and that he believed it to be a knife.
26-30.

Brief of Appellant at

The State defends this misconduct of the prosecutor by

claiming waiver and by urging that the statements of counsel are not
evidence.

Brief of Respondent at 32-33.

The State's contentions

should be rejected.
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court noted, "Nothing in
[Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence] precludes taking notice of
plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not
brought to the attention of the court."
Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (Feb. 1, 1989).

State v. Eldredge, 101 Utah

Mr. Suarez accordingly urges that
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the statements of the prosecutor to the jurors, particularly that he
believed that Mr. Suarez used a knife, meet both prongs of this
state's body of law on prosecutorial misconduct.

See Point IIIB of

Appellant's opening brief (citing State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah
1983); State v. Valdez, 531 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973)).
In agreement, the United States Supreme Court recently
opined:
The line separating acceptable from improper
advocacy is not easily drawn; there is often a
gray zone. Prosecutors sometimes breach their
duty to refrain from overzealous conduct by
commenting on the defendant's guilt and offering
unsolicited views on the evidence.
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 6 (1985).

In criticizing the

Young prosecutor for his behavior, the Court further noted:
It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to
express his or her personal opinion as to the
truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or
the guilt of the defendant.
Id. (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b) (2d ed.
1980)).

The Young Court explained that when prosecutors express

personal opinions on the evidence and/or guilt of the accused, such
action "may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment
rather than its own view of the evidence."

Id.

at 18 (citing

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935)).
The Court found the prosecutor's comments in Young to be
error, albeit harmless due to the defense argument which invited the
error.

_I_d at 22.

Mr. Suarez asserts that on the facts of his case,

the prosecutor's comments were inappropriate and likely influenced
the jury's decision such that error occurred here also.
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He insists

that because of the closeness of the case, the error affected the
outcome and prejudiced his fundamental right to a fair trial.

That

error mandates that his conviction be reversed.

CONCLUSION
For all of any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Gilberto
Suarez requests that this Court review the arguments contained in
his opening brief and this brief and order that either the charge
against him be dismissed or the conviction be vacated and a new
trial ordered.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
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STATE OF UTAH,

PLAINTIFF,

7
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GILBERTO D. SUAREZ,
DEFENDANT.
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CRIMINAL NO. CR-88-307
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TRIAL
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VOLUME I I
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13
14

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON FRIDAY, THE LST DAY

15

OF APRIL, 1988, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 11:05 O'CLOCK

16

A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE

17

COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT

18

LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE

19

HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL

20

DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH.
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CAUSED THAT WOUND BECAUSE NOBODY SAW ANY SORT OF WEAPON

2

AND THAT'S BEEN THE TESTIMONY THUS FAR AS I'VE UNDERSTOOD

3

IT.

4

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT SERIOUS BODILY INJURY UNDER

5

THE DEFINITION

*

BEEN SHOWN THUS FAR BY THE PROSECUTION.

7

IS SOMETHING THAT REQUIRES MORE THAN HAS

THE DEFINTION OF SERIOUS BODILY INJURY IS THAT

8

IT MEANS BODILY INJURY THAT CREATES OR CAUSES SERIOUS

9

PERMANENT DISFIGUREMENT, PROTRACTED LOSS OR IMPAIRMENT OF

10

THE FUNCTION OF ANY BODILY MEMBER OR ORGAN, OR CREATES A

11

SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF DEATH.

12

MY RECOLLECTION OF THE TESTIMONY

IS THAT WE HAVE

13

NOT HAD ANY EVIDENCE THAT ESTABLISHES A PRIMA FACIE CASE

14

OF ANY OF THOSE VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES.

15

AS I'VE INDICATED, THERE'S BEEN NO TESTIMONY ABOUT WHAT

16

CAUSED THAT SO I DON'T THINK THERE'S BEEN AN ESTABLISHMENT

l"7

THAT A DEADLY WEAPON HAS BEEN USED.

I8

AND IN ADDITION,

YOUR HONOR, IN ADDITION, I HAVE THE MATTER-«M

19

THIS IS LEFT OVER FROM YESTERDAY--THAT YOU INDICATED 1 COULD

20

PUT ON THE RECORD.

WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO DO THAT NOW?

21

JUDGE YOUNG:

22

MISS REMAL:

YOU MAY.
THAT IS IN REGARD TO MY REQUEST

23

TO EXCUSE FOR CAUSE, MR. HARRY WOLFORD FROM OUR JURY PANEL.

Z4

I DID ULTIMATELY USE A PREEMPTORY CHALLENGE TO EXCUSE HIM

25

SO HE IS NOT A MEMBER OF OUR JURY AS

IMPANELED.
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AND

FOR

1

THAT REASON I MOVED TO EXCUSE HIM FOR CAUSE, ALTHOUGH, AT

2

THAT TIME DID NOT HAVE THE AFFIDAVIT BECAUSE MISS BERGESON

3

WAS IN THE MIDDLE OF HER TRIAL AT THAT POINT.

4
5

SO I DO PUT THAT ON THE RECORD BECAUSE WE DIDN'T
HAVE A CHANCE TO DO THAT YESTERDAY.

6

JUDGE YOUNG:

YOUR MOTION

IN RELATION TO THE

7

EXCUSING OF MR. WOLFORD FOR CAUSE IS DENIED AND THE COURT

8

FINDS THAT CERTAINLY MR. WOLFORD IS NOT EVEN A PARTICIPANT

9

IN THIS JURY, AND THE FACT HE MAY HAVE MADE THOSE COMMENTS

10
11

12

IN JUDGE RUSSON'S COURT, EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD HAVE BEEN
I EARLIER

IN THE DAY AFTER HAVING HEARD THE EXPLANATIONS OF

JUDGE RUSSON'S IN QUALIFYING THE JURY, AFTER THIS COURT

13 J IN QUALIFYING THE JURY, HE MAY WELL HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD THE
14

RESPONSES HE GAVE EARLIER AND THUS ELECTED NOT TO GIVE HIM

15

LATER.

AND SO IN RELATION TO THE ISSUE OF MR. WOLFORD THE

16

I COURT DENIES ANY CLAIM YOU HAVE TO PREJUDICE, AND CERTAINLY,

17

I MR. WOLFORD IS NOT A PARTICIPANT

IN THIS JURY AND THUS YOUR

IS

UTILIZING A PREEMPTORY CHALLENGE ON HIM TO EXCLUDE HIM CURED

19

ANY DEFAULT THAT YOU WOULD HAVE FOUND IN RELATION TO MR.

20

WOLFORD.

21

22
23

DO YOU DESIRE TO ARGUE, MR. BOWN, IN RELATION
TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS?
MR. BOWN:

JUST BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR.

I THINK

24

THE TEST AT THIS POINT IS THIS EVIDENCE THE JURY WOULD WILL-

25

FULLY BELIEVE A KNIFE WAS USED AND, I THINK THAT ALTHOUGH

27

